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Abstract
This paper analyzes Islamic FBOs’ humanitarian approaches, programs, and challenges. Politicalized religious
interpretations are also on board to investigate their missionary aspects. I design my argument based on Michael
Barnett and Janice Grass Stein’s assumption on the impact of social constructions on establishing sacred and
secular concepts and spaces. Thus, I study the UK-based Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW) and the Kuwaiti Direct Aid
Society (DAS) to examine the influence of their social settings on their humanitarian experiences. My question is
“do different social settings shape various humanitarian approach, although of sharing the same religious mission?”
I argue that Islamic rules encourage Muslims to be religiously committed to paying charity and showing human
and religious solidarity. In this regard, flexible Islamic Fiqh (jurisprudence) allows Muslima to set various socially
constructed implementations of these religious commitments. Humanitarian relief is not an exception in this regard.
Therefore, Islamic FBOs lay down on a continuum based on their socially constructed models which reflect different
interpretations of religious texts and their applications to understanding societal issues as well as various employed
strategies of these civil society actors.
Keywords: Humanitarian relief, Direct Aid Society, Islamic Relief Worldwide, Islamic organizations, Faith-based
organizations, Religious organizations

Introduction
Since the mid-1980s, faith-based organizations (FBOs)
have increasingly involved in humanitarian relief. They
enjoy committed volunteers, plenty of donations, and access to underdeveloped communities. Alongside the
presence of other FBOs, Islamic and Christian organizations became influential actors in the international
arena. They vary in their institutional structure, financial
resources, or interests; some of them collect donations,
while others are funded by religious entities. They either
run by religiously committed volunteers or hire professional staff. However, they share a religious mission with
caring traditions and long-lasting societal impacts. Frequently linked to the increasing politicization of religion,
FBOs challenge blurry borders between “humanitarian
Correspondence: rihamamahrous@hotmail.com
Department of International Studies, College of Humanities and Social
Sciences, Zayed University, Academic City, P.O. BOX: 19282, Dubai, United
Arab Emirates

mission” and “religious missionary” as well as revise
dominant secular settings of humanitarian relief.
In this paper, I analyze Islamic FBOs’ humanitarian
approaches, programs, and challenges. Politicalized religious interpretations are also on board to investigate
their missionary aspects. Theoretically, Michael Barnett
and Janice Grass Stein argue that secularization and
sanctification are multilayered, multidimensional, and
nonlinear. The historically constructed process comes
first to establish sacred and secular concepts and spaces.
Then, setting, stabilizing, or modifying them might be a
strategy that is employed by different actors to further
their agendas (Barnett and Stein 2012: 11). It is not only
about religious rules but also social contexts matter.
Based on this argument, I study two Islamic FBOs’
humanitarian relief to trace the impacts of different
social constructions on shaping their approaches and
programs, while sharing the same religious mission.
The two studied cases are the UK-based Islamic Relief
Worldwide (IRW) and the Kuwaiti Direct Aid Society
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(DAS). Although based in different countries, both are
active Islamic humanitarian organizations. I examine the
influence of their social settings on their humanitarian
approaches and experiences. My question is “do different
social settings shape various humanitarian approaches,
although of sharing the same religious mission?” I argue
that Islamic rules encourage Muslims to be religiously
committed to paying charity and showing human and
religious solidarity. In this regard, Islamic Fiqh (jurisprudence) flexibility allows Muslims to set various socially
constructed implementations of these religious commitments. Humanitarian relief is not an exception in this
regard. Islamic FBOs lay down on a continuum; various
models reflect different interpretations of religious texts
and their applications to understanding societal issues as
well as several employed strategies of these civil society
actors. Therefore, I divided my paper into two sections.
The first one explores the theoretical, socioeconomic,
and political aspects of FBO, with a special emphasis on
the Islamic ones. The second section elaborates on the
two Islamic FBOs case studies; empirically compare their
backgrounds, developmental and humanitarian approaches, and executive programs to examine differences
and similarities of their visions and actions. Finally, the
conclusion predicts the potential flourishing or falling of
Islamic FBOs’ roles.

historically established privatization of religious practices
is increasingly challenged by a robust tendency toward a
public reconsideration of religious ties. Simultaneously,
neoliberal policies overload individuals with social and
economic responsibilities, while significantly eliminate
the state’s public funding. Within this context, religious
structures eagerly run to fill this gap, and rapidly expand
their influence in social, political, and humanitarian
fields.
Charles Taylor classifies three major processes that are
necessary for achieving secularization in any society;
declining belief in God, decreasing the importance of religion and religious organizations, and developing changed conditions of belief (Harding 2013: 342). The first
process reflects a personal choice, in which individuals
enjoy the freedom of privatizing their religious faith or
simply giving it up. The other two processes are socially
constructed, as being inherited from historical traditions
and integrated into daily practices. So, the inclusion of
new social groups with diverse values and desires might
re-question settled legacies and arrangements. The
snowballing multicultural immigration flux has introduced the European societies to various heritages of the
conditions of belief. Multiculturalism has paved a way to
a timid revival of the belief in God, so religious organizations have enhanced their social presence and influence.
This slowly develops several socially constructed versions of secularization and scarification in Western societies (Barnett and Stein 2012: 10).
Barnett and Grass Stein define secularization of humanitarianism as “the process by which elements of
every day and the profane insinuate themselves and become integrated into humanitarianism, thus challenging
its scared standings” (Barnett and Stein 2012: 8). This
process of secularization requires a growing role of the
state and the market, implies a centrality of the fund,
and expects an effective and efficient performance from
humanitarian relief organizations. Recently, many of
these requirements have gradually declined in contemporary European societies to be replaced by various
levels of sanctification. Per Barnett and Grass Stein,
sanctification is a free space of politics, inspired primarily by humanitarian values and motivated purely by innocent and altruistic incentives, which could apply to
religious organizations. Both secularization and sanctification evolve in historically dynamic ways to shape
trends, practices, and tensions of humanitarianism (Barnett and Stein 2012: 8).
Secular humanitarian organizations are by no means
less ethical than their religious counterparts. However,
the former seems to be less missionary; more professional, and considerably supported by their states or official regional or international institutions. The latter is
generally missionary based; its professionality is less

First section: Islamic FBOs: theoretical,
socioeconomic, and political aspects
During the last two decades, social science scholars and
civil society activists have expressed an increasing interest in investigating FBOs’ roles (Kemper 2006: 141-153).
Numerous articles and research papers sought to define
the concept of FBOs; question their goals; and evaluate
their effectiveness, subjectivity, and religiosity. Scholars
debate several formulas for potential inclusion or exclusion of these organizations in contemporary humanitarian relief and developmental activities (Bielefeld and
Cleveland 2013: 445-446). This section aims to contribute to this debate throughout discussing the remarkable
theoretical, socioeconomic, and political aspects of
FBOs, with special emphasis on the Islamic model.
Theoretical aspects—religion in public humanitarian
sphere

After decades of disconnecting religious faith from the
larger public sphere, social processes have gradually
opened a space for the resurgence of religious life in
contemporary society. Legally connected, but culturally
fragmented societies have tried to develop shared values
and norms and consequently establish communal institutions. Religious faiths seem like one of the rare traditions that could shape a similar collective sense and
suggest a base for its relevant actions. Thus, the Western
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emphasized and is mostly energized by communal voluntary arrangements. Religious humanitarianism refers
to actions that go beyond traditional social-relational activities. It clearly states religious incentives, implies faithfriendly mechanisms, and partially assesses its works
considering religious obligations and rewards.
Investigating the Swedish community, Tobias Harding
observes a growing interest influence of various religious
faiths, including the newly introduced ones by immigrants. They used to be recognized by the state as
domestic multiculturalism, but the Swedish neocorporative system allows ethnic associations and FBOs
an expanding role in delivering welfare services. Per
Harding, this role is a turning point of contemporary domestic societal mechanisms (Harding 2013: 344). More
broadly, Alastair Ager describes the growing involvement of FBOs and local faith communities in humanitarian relief as a “post-secular age.” Referring to their
religious faiths, these organizations challenge the dominant humanitarian values and norms. Settled humanitarian values have been articulated based on secular
consistent concepts. Thus, FBOs’ struggle to strictly follow these values and norms might neither fulfill their
volunteers’ requests nor satisfy recipient communities’
expectations (Ager 2014: 17-18)1.
From another perspective, Khaled Mansour and Heba
Raouf Ezzat criticize the over-simplistic differentiation
between FBOs and secular societal organizations. Per
them, any distinction between both humanitarian institutional forms merely reflects certain social and historical experiences (Mansour and Ezzat, 2009: 123, 127).
Such a debate used to be irrelevant to the traditions of
most of the non-Western societies. Due to the rapid
modernization and intensive globalization of these societies, they have recently recognized this debate, but still
with limited domestic consequences. Mansour and Ezzat
argue that many active members in Islamic FBOs denounce secularization of humanitarian relief as targeting
to deprive the religious identity of their activities (Mansour and Ezzat 2009: 123, 127). Yet, this debate sounds
very relevant to Western-based Islamic FBOs’ roles,
especially those are done in Western and non-Western
societies, and challenged by different setting alongside
various expectations.
In the Islamic model, religious jurisprudence allows a
flexible understanding of the Holy Qur’an and the
prophet’s sayings and deeds, as main sources of Islamic
rules, to accommodate changeable realities. The Ultimate goals of the Islamic Shariah (rules) are to preserve

the life, the wealth, the human reason, the human species, and the honor or dignity of all humanity. Some interpretations understand the last goal as the preservation
of the religion itself. These goals set a comprehensive
and universal humanitarian mission for Muslims. Only a
few compulsory rules are mentioned in the Holy Qur’an.
Otherwise, Islamic jurisprudence sets the concepts of
Maslaha (interest) and Mafsadah (corruption) to evaluate each deed and flexibly balance its religious rewards
or punishment considering contemporary contexts. The
level of the sanctification of each action varies and actual
priorities create their relevant sacred duties. Lacking any
hierarchical religious institutions in the Islamic traditions, especially the Sunni, encourages constructive diversity of interpretations of religious texts and the
implementations of relevant commitments.
Conceptually, the widely used definition of FBOs are
“those humanitarian relief and development organizations formed by or with a direct or indirect relationship
to a specific faith community.” Islamic FBOs, especially
Sunni ones, could be slightly different. They are usually
launched by individuals’ independent initiatives, and in
few cases, governmental patronage or support might
come second. While the Islamic Shi’ai hierarchical structure facilitates the establishment of many Shi’ai FBOs;
each is closely connected to a certain Shi’ai Hawza
(seminary) and enjoys its financial patronage. Few Shi’ai
organizations independently established themselves, like
the Aga Khan Foundation. Although its founder is the
head of the Ismaili Shi’ai, the Foundation introduces itself as a secular entity. Sunni and Shi’ai FBOs are generally committed to implementing Islamic rules. I believe
further research is needed to compare various cases of
Sunni and Shi’ai FBOs, and investigate their common or
dissimilar characteristics considering their similar religious faith, but belonging to different sects. However, I
focus in this paper on two Islamic FBOs that share the
same Sunni background to avoid any variances in their
referred theology during the process of testing my
hypothesis.
Bruno De Cordier suggests a definition of Islamic
FBOs, as “non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that
were founded on the initiative of Muslims, that mobilize
most of their support among Muslims, and whose action
is, to varying degrees and in various forms, inspired and
legitimated by the Islamic religion or at least certain tenets thereof” (De Cordier 2009: 609). His definition noticeably explains these organizations’ activities, while it
misses their religious agenda. Less attention is paid to
clarify their religious mission and goals. Consistently, it
calls them “Muslims Faith-Based organizations” to
emphasize on their active participants instead of describing them as “Islamic organizations” and connecting them
directly to the religious faith (De Cordier 2009: 609). I

1

For examples of this trend, see Act Alliance, The role of faith-based
organizations in humanitarian response: a reflection on the unique role
of FBOs in humanitarian crises, 2015, http://actalliance.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/WHSSubmission_ACTAlliance_Role-ofFBOs-in-Hum-Response_July2015.pdf, p.3
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think that Islamic FBOs are better defined as “Faith inspired organizations which are instituted with a mission
statement informed by generalized spiritual principals,
perhaps of one of the major world religions, but which
are founded and run independently of any specifically
identified faith community” 2. For Islamic cases, differences between faith-inspired organizations and FBOs are
sometimes blurred.

coherent management structures and suffer less
organizational weakness comparing to their NGO counterparts (Clerkin and Grønbjerg 2007: 115-126).
Religious organizations, especially in the non-Western
communities, are deeply rooted and well informed about
their societal contexts. So, they can diagnose causal factors behind most of their fundamental challenges. Rising
poverty, high unemployment rates, and wide social exploitation have motivated the establishment of various
FBOs in many underdeveloped countries. They show
deep social commitment, cultural sensitivity, and convenient accessibility to different social classes. Based on
their religious backgrounds, they also form coherent vision about required changes and expected outcomes.
FBO positively run their activities alongside a constructive governmental role and in a welcoming society. Multilayer social evils, disputed actors, fragmented political
approaches, and social resistance hinder FBOs’ effectiveness in achieving their targeted social change. Rick
James acknowledges FBOs as “providing efficient development services; reach the poorest at the grassroots;
having a long term sustainable presence, being legitimate
and values by the poorest, providing an alternative to
secular theory for development, eliciting motivated and
voluntary service, encouraging civil society advocate”
(James, 2011: 111).
Empirical studies stress the significance of psychological support alongside material relief for people in
war-torn or post-conflict societies, or even after a
natural catastrophe (Barnett and Stein 2012: 22; Act
Alliance 2015: 1; (James, 2011: 113-114)). Inspired by
their religious missions, FBOs offer spiritual assistance
for their targeted beneficiaries, alongside the materialistic support. They show respect for hosting communities’
faiths and seek local consensus on controversial social issues, such as women’s rights or HIV/AIDS. Neglecting
such actions could jeopardize the efficiency and effectiveness of any relief tasks (Kirmani et al. 2008: 8). For
example, Muslim and Christian religious leaders played
influential roles in the response to epidemic Ebola in
West African countries. They adopted a holistic approach to replace the message of fear with a message of
hope, shape new attitudes toward affected people, and
transform physical and spiritual practices of local community members (Featherstone 2015: 9-10). Similar roles
are usually expected and welcomed regarding HIV/
AIDS, most recently the pandemic COVID-19. FBOs frequently invest religious local leaders’ support to facilitate
achieving their goals.
In the Islamic case, religious rules explicitly recommend conducting as well as funding societal services
and developmental goals. Financially capable Muslims
must pay Zakat (regulated obligatory charity) and are
encouraged to donate Sadaqat (unlimited voluntary

Socioeconomic aspects—always here and there

Historically, religious communities used to fulfill societal
needs throughout charitable activities and humanitarian relief. Only since the nineteenth century, major secular humanitarian organizations have been established, with a
substantial expansion in the twentieth century. The Red
Cross and anti-slavery organizations are only a couple of
centuries old. UNHCR was a sign of an intergovernmental
organization in the 1960s (Ferris 2005: 313-316). Simultaneous with the European secularization, FBOs have been
marginalized in the international humanitarian relief, while
they have maintained their influential developmental roles
in non-Western communities. Since the early 1980s, these
communities have witnessed a mushrooming expansion of
their local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including FBOs. Due to sharing similar concerns and cultural
understandings, local FBOs successfully involved in several
societal projects and enjoyed convenient access to their
local communities (Ferris 2005: 316). Various religious
faiths established FBOs, like Islamic, Hundi, Christian, and
Jewish cases (Mansour and Ezzat 2009: 118).
Academic comparison between NGOs and FBOs concluded that both models provide social services at almost
a similar quality. FBOs are, theoretically, classified within
the gray area between NGOs and religious organizations.
Paving a new path, they integrate humanitarian incentives
as well as religious commitments; they could conduct
NGOs’ civic roles with a religious added value3. This is
hardly related to the level of the ethicality of each model,
but it is mainly linked to their different missions. Further
research is recommended to deeply compare between
both missions and trace their humanitarian and developmental approaches and programs. FBOs can recruit
religiously-dedicated volunteers and secure financial resources from religious charities. While NGOs have increasingly sought domestic or international governmental
funds, which questioning their non-governmentality
(Ebaugh et al. 2003: 411-426). Additionally, FBOs enjoy
2

Secular humanitarian organizations were established to engage in
relief and development work without preference to any spiritual
foundations, but rather, are generally, organized around “universal”
human rights principals. For more details, see Act Alliance 2015: 5.
3
For a detailed comparison between FBOs and NGOs, see Clarke et al.
2015: pp.40-46.
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charity)4. Both support activities aim to satisfying
Allah as well as showing human solidarity. Although
priority is given for serving Muslims, non-Muslims
are also covered. Waqf (endowment) is an institutionalized form of Sadaqat Garyia (running and sustainable voluntary charity). Widely established Islamic
endowments effectively contributed to delivering social services in their local communities, such as education, social care, health services, and humanitarian
relief. Historically, these financially independent endowments secured most of the required infrastructure
of their societies and offered sustainable developmental services. Contemporary Islamic FBOs are guided
by Islamic teachings as well as inspired by Waqf’s historical experiences (Mansour and Ezzat 2009: 120).
Both are religiously inspired and targeted humanitarian and developmental goals. Like Waqf, Islamic FBOs
enjoy considerable financial independence and devoted volunteers. Governmentally funded FBOs, either
supported by local governments or intergovernmental
organizations, frequently suffer political and logistical
challenges5. Lacking any Islamic hierarchal religious
institutions also allows FBOs significant autonomy in
accommodating religious commitments to fit recipient
societies6.

faith-based initiative maintained most of Bush’s rules. In
early May 2018, President Donald Trump announced an
executive order to expand the allocation of the government grants and the arranged partnerships with FBOs
through a newly established faith-based office (Bailey
and Boorstein 2018).
These
procedures
frequently
question
the
secularization process of Western societies and the
level of religiosity of delivering their social services
(Anti-Defamation League 2012: 1-5). Neoliberalism intensively encourages the market based providing of social services. In this regard, reliable substitutes of the
state’s role were needed to avoid the serious consequences of these policies. FBOs practically enjoy accessibility in inner communities far more than the state or
the market. Thus, George W. Bush and Tony Blair described sometimes as religiously inspired politicians, facilitated the replacement of these organizations’ societal
interventions to a shrinking state’s role (Zehavi 2008,
347). Jeffrey C. Issac criticizes these initiatives and
stresses that a promising contribution by civil society to
public policy in the post-welfare state should address
structural social and economic challenges, raise fundamental issues, question statist policies, and oppose unregulated capitalist markets (Issac 2003: 9). Supposedly,
FBOs should seek profound social change, instead of
contributing to the current system’s survival process.
So far, many FBOs have been integrated into the current
international neoliberal system. However, with limited potential for changing the economic policies, they enhance
the sanctification process of their social context. Unfortunately, religious hands have increasingly contributed to
fixing neoliberal deficiencies and mitigating their societal
consequences. Relevantly, Bruno De Cordier examines the
“Mountain Societies Development Support Program
(MDSP)”, which was initiated by the Aga Khan Foundation since 1993, and has operated humanitarian relief and
developmental activities in an Ismaili Shi’ites-majority Tajiki providence. The program changed traditional economic structures in a way that De Cordier argues to
benefit Aga Khan’s corporate. Bitterly, he criticizes such
social and humanitarian programs that closely connected
to religious leaders, while facilitating corporate’s control
(De Cordier 2008: 170-172). Referring to all humanitarian
organizations, Patrick Gibbons considers that “those organizations that continue to strive to priorities the needs of
the victims of disasters and live by the traditional humanitarian principles are in the minority in this category”
(Gibbons 2005: 12-13).

Political aspects—neoliberalism and terrorism

The increasing interest in FBOs’ humanitarian and developmental roles has been associated with the broad
execution of neoliberal policies as well as the increasing
terrorist attacks.
Neoliberalism

Gerard Clarks traces the evolving importance of FBOs
back to the early 1990s following the publication of the
World Bank study “Voices of Poor,” which acknowledged their developmental activities. More appreciation
was expressed later by the World Bank administration
and the UK Department of International Development
to encourage enhancing these roles (Clarke 2007: 81-83).
British motivating policies were followed by the Clinton’s charitable choice provision in 1996 and the Bush’s
faith-based initiative in 2001. Both allow FBOs to be eligible for the federal fund, without requiring suppressing
or concealing their religious identity or practices (Carlson-Thies 2009: 936). Under George W. Bush’s administration, American FBO received federal grants totaling
more than ten billion dollars. Obama’s version of the
4

For additional details, see Mansour and Ezzat 2009: pp.119-122.
For more information about the difficulties facing state-affiliated
FBOs, see Svoboda et al. 2015; similar case could be noticed in Human
Rights Commission, see Petersen 2012-2013, pp.34-36.
6
For more details about the differences among various FBOs, see
Clarke and Ware 2015: p.40.
5

Terrorism

Simultaneous with the flourishing of the FBOs in the
1990s, Samuel Huntington predicted an outbreak of a
clash among religiously classified civilizations, as
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religious legacies have a distinctive and lasting imprint
in universal values. Thus, FBOs’ activities might be politically propagated, and economically interrelated with
governments, multinational corporations, and international institutions’ interests (Mansour and Ezzat
2009: 123). Close to Barnett and Grass Stein’s argument, Jonathan Benthall and Jerome Bellion-Jourdan
stress that religious legacies “are always selectively rebuilt to fulfill contemporary objectives” (Benthall and
Bellion-Jourdan 2009: 154). Per them, this could apply
to Christian as well as Islamic organizations. For Christian cases, they refer to the close relationship between
the NATO forces and FBOs in Kosovo in 1999. Later,
Christian evangelicals FBOs, especially Americans, were
assigned to carry out emergency operations after the
US-led military invasion in Afghanistan and Iraq in
2001 and 2003 respectively (Mansour and Ezzat 2009:
130-131).
Following the Islamic FBOs’ influential roles in the
Afghan war (1978-1992) and Bosnia war (1992-1995),
unproved accusations of their connections to terrorism
have been firstly raised by Middle Eastern governments,
especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Mansour and Ezzat
2009: 123-129). These governments aimed to weaken
domestic Islamist political opposition by internationally
restricting their humanitarian arms. After 9/11,
Western governments widely accused most of the Islamic international FBOs of facilitating funding militant
terrorism. Consequently, these governments adopted
two strategies: chasing and coopting. Firstly, some of
the accused organizations were shut down. Survival
ones suffered tight restrictions on their money transfers
and bank accounts and were enforced to conduct
security clearance for their employees and submit
detailed reports on their ongoing activities. The local
governments had to impose these restrictions, regardless of their trust in targeted FBOs (Mansour and Ezzat
2009: 125-131).
Secondly, the cooption strategy was developed a few
years later, encouraged the World Bank to revise its
policies and seek active partnerships with FBO. Selected partner organizations included mainly Christian
organizations and a few European-based Islamic ones.
British and Dutch governments adopted a domestic
similar strategy (Petersen: 2012: 5). Potential partnerships highly recommended that FBOs should achieve
a significant alignment with the universal humanitarian values and professional standards. Thus, Islamic
FBOs that sought to be involved in these partnerships
had to adjust their speeches, goals, and programs to
follow these recommendations. An accepted formula
that integrated Islamic faith, international recommendations, and domestic settings was a challenge for
each FBO.

Second section: Islamic FBOs—different contexts,
altered paths
I investigate backgrounds, humanitarian approaches, and
programs of the two Islamic FBOs case studies; the Kuwaiti Direct Aid Society (DAS) and the UK-based Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW). Based on Barnett and
Stein’s argument on secularization and scarification, I
compare these organizations’ interpretations of religious
texts and implementations of their Islamic mission considering their different social contexts. By this, I seek to
answer the question: “do different social settings shape
various humanitarian approaches, although of sharing
the same religious mission?” I argue that their different
social contexts produce altered paths of their humanitarian relief efforts as well as their understandings of their
Islamic “mission.” I selected these cases according to
their programs’ geographical coverage and the level of
governmental patronage.
For the first criterion, the DAS is active beyond its Kuwaiti local community and dominantly operates its programs in African countries. The IRW runs domestic and
international humanitarian as well as developmental
programs; contrarily to many Western-based Islamic
FBOs which exclusively operate local community programs7. On the other side, neither the DAS nor the IRW
is financially supported by any government. I excluded
governmentally subsidized Islamic FBOs, such as the
Saudi International Islamic Relief Organization (IIROSA), although it used to be one of the largest Islamic
FBOs worldwide8. Such organizations suffer strict official
censorship and are frequently accused of propagating
states’ ideologies, such as Wahhabism/Salafism (Clarke
2007: 83-84). Selected cases secure their financial resources from charitable donations, mostly are religiously based, such as Zakat and Sadaqat. Both
established their Waqf Islamic endowments to create a
sustainable financial source for funding their operated
programs. The IRW sometimes receives the British
governmental grants that are allocated to support the
civil society sector. Still, both should follow domestic
regulations and auditing standards; and carefully consider their countries’ political and social sensitivities.
None of them directly promotes their home country’s
policies. However, throughout legalizing these organizations, the British and Kuwaiti governments could
propagate their domestic policies and avoid critics for
their international interventions. Profound opposition
against governmental choices might hardly be developed within this context.
7

An example of these organizations is the Swedish Ibn Rushd Study
Organization, see Harding 2013: 345.
8
The International Islamic Relief Organizations was unjustifiably
banned in Saudi Arabia at December 2015.
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The Kuwaiti Direct Aid Society (DAS) and the UKbased Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW) share some
significant characteristics of their backgrounds. Both
were established in the mid-1980s as a response to a
severe famine in Africa, and their founders were medical
doctors, the Kuwaiti Abdul Rahman Al Sumit and the
Egyptian-originated Hany El-Banna respectively. The
DAS was primarily established in 1981, under the titled
“Malawi Muslims Committee,” shortly later, it expanded
its activities beyond Malawi. In 1984, the organization
changed its name into the “Africa Muslim Committee.”
Not until 1999, it got its current name as the “Direct
Aid Society” (Direct Aid Society, 2019). Since its establishment, the organization’s humanitarian and developmental programs have benefited Muslims as well as
non-Muslims in hosted communities. In parallel, the
IRW was established in Birmingham, UK, in 1984, and
launched various humanitarian programs in Africa, Iran,
Afghanistan, and Iraq, alongside some domestic activities. Throughout the 1990s, it intensively contributed to
humanitarian relief efforts in the Bosnian war. It was
internationally acknowledged as a “moderate” and welltrusted Islamic FBO. Since 1994, it has been qualified to
receive British governmental competitive grants and join
numerous domestic and international partnerships, with
governmental and non-governmental organizations.
Additional to its various international branches, the
IRW established few affiliated organizations under its
umbrella but they are legally independent entities.
Charles Taylor distinguishes between different conditions of belief. A set of conditions is connected to a society in which the belief of God is a dominant approach.
Another set of conditions is related to other societies in
which irrelevant reasoning to the belief of God is expected in most contexts (Harding 2013: 342). I apply
Taylor’s sets to the social contexts of the studied organizations. The Kuwaiti DSA is based on a conservative
Muslim community, in which Islam is the dominant
religion, and religious rituals and rules are habitually
integrated into the public and private daily life.
Proselytization to Islam is a favorable task and considered a religious commitment. A wide understanding of
the Ultimate goals of Islamic Shari’ah refers to preserving human dignity by materialistic and spiritual
methods. The secular universal language of humanity is
not common because people believe that Islam is already
a universal religion. Public interpretations of Islamic
goals favor showing solidarity with other Muslims as a
priority.
Kuwaiti regime partially gains its political legitimacy
from being religiously conservative. The tribal local society has accumulated hung financial individual as well as
governmental surpluses in a welfare state that subsidized

social services. Thus, Kuwaiti Islamic FBOs target
international communities in their humanitarian and
developmental missions. Still, they domestically are welcomed and receive voluntary donations from the Royal
Family and wealthy commercial elites. Volunteers are
religiously-committed and motivated to support underprivileged communities suffering from conflicts or
epidemic diseases. The DAS’s founder, Abdul Rahman
Al-Sumit (1947-2013), spent most of his medical career
(1983-2008) in Africa and stressed his religious and humanitarian “missions” there. However, since 2001, the
Kuwaiti government has strictly imposed internationally
required legal and financial revision and restrictions on
local FBOs, including the DSA.
Within a different context, the IRW was established in
Birmingham by a few Muslim immigrant doctors. An increasing significance of Muslim minorities has raised
several inquiries about the challenging conditions of belief in God in Western secular societies, comparing to
the case in Muslims-majority societies. The Islamic Fiqh
(jurisprudence) of minorities has been developed to help
Muslim immigrants understanding the Ultimate goals of
Islamic Shari’ah considering their social contexts. Per
Mansour and Ezzat expected interpretation of religious
texts and their understanding of social issues should be
“free from narrow, local considerations and the impact
of community norms in respective countries on the
limits of thinking about Islamic issues” (Mansour and
Ezzat 2009: 142). Thus, this jurisprudence discusses
secularized cultures and examines the privatization of
religious faiths. It debates the Muslims’ inclusion in
Western conditions of belief and their attempts to reach
more sanctification of the public sphere. Four hundred
constitutes and two hundred board members of American Muslim organizations were surveyed. They acknowledged the substantial impacts of their religious beliefs
and humanitarian values on their decisions, while admitted that humanitarian “secular” reports are less influential in this regard. Other studies concluded with similar
results for various immigrant groups; as they sought to
maintain their cultural and religious identities more than
being integrated into the American culture (Bielefeld
and Cleveland, 2013: 455).
Petersen argues that Islam is merely one of the IRW’s
characteristics and not embedded in every aspect of its
programs, structure, and behaviors (Petersen 2012: 130131). The IRW’s speech reflects its formula of compromising religious concepts and universal language. It
integrates most of the humanitarian universal values into
the Islamic value system; as both target human solidarity
and dignity. The IRW adopts compulsory Islamic rules,
such as free-interest loans and the prohibition of
abortion. Otherwise, it evaluates its approach, goals, and
programs considering Islamic concepts of Maslaha

Different contexts
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(interest) and Mafsadah (corruption) to shape its religiously inspired path. Contrarily to most Islamic FBOs’
leaders, Hany El-Banna, the IRW’s founder, recognized
international restrictions imposed after 9/11 as an opportunity that encouraged Islamic FBOs to enhance their
professionalism and transparency (Mansour and Ezzat
2009: 134). He strictly distanced the IRW apart from
other international Islamic FBOs because some of these
organizations were accused of funding terrorist groups.
El-Banna benefited from the IRW’s cooperative relations
with the British government to promote the organization’s international humanitarian role. Henceforward, it
has intensified its universal language more than borrowing Islamic terms. Petersen observed a surprising expansion of the IRW’s programs after 9/1; as it turned to be
the largest transnational Muslim organization worldwide. During the 1990s, its budget was about ten million
dollars, but a few years later its annual budget reached
more than 60 million dollars. Internationally welcomed,
it has become a leading partner with many international
donor organizations (Petersen 2012: 145).

cultural sensitivity favor their work in Muslim-majority
societies. Moreover, the IRW joined numerous international partnerships, which targeted Muslim societies,
to benefit from its relative advantages. Except for the
DAS’s religious-based programs, both deliver social and
developmental services for non-Muslims to express
human bonds.
Offered services include humanitarian as well as developmental support, although operated programs vary
from an organization to the other. The DAS aims to
change the African communities to be “free from
illiteracy, poverty, and diseases” (Direct Aid Society,
2019). Thus, it mainly provides education, health care,
and developmental services. It operates programs to
carry out or support undergraduate and graduate education as well as the adult and vocational education. Its developmental programs fund agricultural projects and
social care. Health services are provided by permanent
and mobile clinics; performing eye surgeries is common
in these clinics. Urgent humanitarian relief also delivers
health care in targeted communities. Some offered services primarily serve Muslims, with an unclear status of
non-Muslims. In Islamic festivals, the DAS distributes
Qurbani meats, and Ramadan fasting parcels for Muslims (Direct Aid Society Annual Report 2013, 2019). The
DAS runs regular proselytization programs, and funds
building mosques and religious educational institutes. In
2013, its operated programs include 155 Qur’an competitions, 451 proselytization trips, 83 religious camps, 105
training for preachers, 104 classes for newly converted
Muslims, and 767 radio programs (Direct Aid Society
Annual Report 2013, 2019)
More widely, the IRW operates humanitarian relief
and development programs. It pays special attention to
offering urgent humanitarian relief during political conflicts or epidemic diseases. It delivers food parcels, clothing, shelters, and sponsorships of orphans. Furthermore,
it establishes developmental programs to raise awareness
of reproductive health, support educational services, and
fund microcredit projects, especially in the post-wars or
natural disasters societies (Mamoun 2010 10). Comparing to the DAS, the IRW runs only a few religiousfocused services; it occasionally distributes Qurbani
meats and Ramadan food parcels. The organization
mostly offers general services which are commonly
needed and easily adopted in various hosted societies.
The IRW argues that neither proselytization nor building mosques are included in its mission. Meanwhile, it
focuses on fighting illiteracy, illness, and poverty as its
recognized Islamic mission.

Altered paths

FBOs share various moralities, which are classified
within three major assessment categories: organizational
control, expression of religion, and program implementation. The program implementation is examined by
investigating the selection of service provided, the integration of religious elements in service delivery, and the
voluntary or mandatory participation in specific religious
activities (Bielefeld and Cleveland 2013: 446-447). Relevant to my argument, I analyze the two organizations’
operating programs according to the implementation
criteria.
Provided services

Provided services could be evaluated based on two dimensions: geographical expansion and offered services.
The DAS and the IRW operate most of their programs
in Muslim-majority countries and stress that they
equally provide services for Muslims as well as nonMuslims in targeted societies. Recently, they expanded
their programs to a few non-Muslim majority countries.
Since its inception, the DAS has exclusively operated its
programs in African countries, and later, it launched
some activities in Tunisia and Yemen. Thanks to its
wealthy society and welfare state, it does not run any domestic programs. Differently, the IRW seeks to expand
its programs worldwide, with limited actual expansion
beyond the Muslim-majority countries. It also runs a
few domestic programs to provide some developmental
services. Geographical expansion in both cases reflects
the prioritizing of showing solidarity with Muslims. Logistic factors, such as their friendly accessibility and

Religious elements in delivered service

FBOs usually serve religiously similar communities to
benefit from their cultural accessibility. Recipient
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communities generally expect religious aspects of their
provided services. Expectations vary among societies and
FBOs; it ranges from teaching religious rituals and theology to offering free-interest loans and preventing
abortion surgeries. Another implicit expectation is that
Islamic FBOs might favor Muslims in the process of
delivering services. The frequent selection of Muslimmajority societies to host FBOs’ humanitarian programs
shows considerable religious solidarity. Paradoxically,
FBOs are currently challenged by calls to secularize their
operated programs and de-religious delivered services,
although this practically de-activates their religious
essence.
Direct religious elements could be traced in many of
the DAS-operated programs. It funds religious educational programs, which are opened to Muslims by birth
and newly converted ones. These programs teach Islamic
rules and enhance religious values. Another special program is dedicated to allowing poor Muslims to travel to
Haj (traveling to Mecca is the Islamic faith fifth pillar).
Also, the DAS established two universities in Kenya and
Zanzibar in 1997 and 1998, respectively, which target to
increase the number of educated Muslims in these countries, while they still serve non-Muslims. Both offer
bachelor’s degrees in applied sciences, humanities,
Arabic language, and Islamic Studies9. The DAS supports proselytization efforts and train local preachers.
Although declared as non-discriminatory, its humanitarian and developmental programs refer to Islamic rules,
like offering free-interest loans and opposing abortion.
Closely, the IRW mostly operates in Muslim-majority
communities and stresses that it equally offers its humanitarian and developmental services to Muslims as
well as non-Muslims. These programs avoid offering
interest loans or abortion medical care; however, direct
religious services could hardly be traced in this regard.
The organization emphasizes on delivering capacitybuilding services rather than establishing mosques or
digging wells (Petersen 2012: 148). Benthall noticed that
while the Turkish Red Crescent built mosques in Ache
after the Tsunami in 2004, the IRW abstained to take a
similar action. Interestingly, Turkey defines itself as a
secular state, while the IRW is recognized as an Islamic
FBO. The organization claims to avoid any infiltration of
religion into relief or developmental goals (Benthall
2008). Its religiously relevant programs, such as the distribution of Ramadan food parcels and Qurbani meat,
are separated from its other humanitarian or developmental activities. Ironically, the IRW logo contains Islamic symbols more than its counterpart belongs to the
DAS. The latter organization clearly expresses its

religious affiliations and goals, and easily integrates them
in its delivered services, while the former points out to
its religious commitments in vague terms and hesitantly
combines religious activities in its operated programs;
not similar cautions are expressed in its religious-based
fund-raising process10.
Differences between the two organizations reflect various degrees of the socially constructed secularization and
sanctification of humanitarian activities in their
headquarter-based societies. The Kuwaiti society explicitly
encourages integrating religious dimensions in provided
services to acknowledge Islamic solidarity. Contrarily, British society favors a clear distinction between religious connotations and delivered social services to avoid potential
discrimination among recipients. Sharing a close understanding of humanitarian actions, promising partnerships
between the IRW and other international secular organizations have successfully achieved. The DAS mostly joins
regional and international partnerships with other FBOs
that follow a similar religious understanding of humanitarian relief. Religiously, Islamic jurisprudence welcomes
both approaches, as both show humanitarian solidarity
with human beings regardless of their religion. Working
mechanisms still depend on the organizations’ social contexts to adjust the level of secularization or sanctification
of each society. The only red line in this regard is violating
any Islamic compulsory rule. Otherwise, numerous humanitarian and developmental activities are recommended. Each organization could design its favored
approach to balance its religious norms and societal
mechanisms.

9

For more information about the educational role of the Direct Aid
Society, see Yahya 2016: pp.122-131.

Obligatory participation in specific religious activities

Neither the DAS nor the IRW has shown any indication
that they require service recipients to participate in specific religious activities. Both stress that they deliver their
services equally regardless of race, gender, or religion. The
DAS religious proselytization programs acknowledge the
freedom of conversion and belief and no evidence was
traced linking between the conversion of Islam and delivering the organization’s social services. Adopting the DAS
to its current name was justified by the actual expansion
of delivered services to cover Muslims and non-Muslims.
The IRW does not run any proselytization programs.

Conclusion: Islamic FBOs’ future—flourishing or
falling
The flourishing of FBOs’ humanitarian and developmental
roles raises questions about their different approaches,
10

Both organizations accept Islamic obligatory and voluntary charity.
Donors can establish an Islamic endowment to sustainably fund any of
their programs. IRW puts a calculator of obligatory charity in its
official website (Islamic Relief Worldwide,2019)
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goals, and mechanisms. In Western societies, the influx of
immigrants and neoliberal policies encourage the reconsideration of these organizations’ influence. They also
maintain an appreciated role in the non-Western communities. I compared two Islamic FBOs: the Kuwaiti Direct
Aid Society (DAS) and the UK-based Islamic Relief
Worldwide (IRW). While the Kuwaiti religious society significantly enhances the religious aspects of the DAS’s humanitarian and developmental approach, the British
secular context lessens the IRW’s religious expressions.
The challenge was how to explain their relevancy to the
Islamic faith, although of their variant approaches. Historically, each Muslim society used to smoothly develop its
formula of charitable activities and humanitarian relief.
The “socially-constructed model” refers in this case to any
version of Islamic interpretation that adopts a suitable approach, set reasonable goals, and creates friendly mechanisms to its society. As long as Islamic FBOs still seek the
Ultimate goals of Islamic Shari’ah, there will be no issues
in the variation of their perspectives, goals, and target
audiences of their humanitarian and developmental
activities.
Due to the expected countless FBOs’ humanitarian
formulas, I predict these organizations’ future in light of
four factors: theoretical, socioeconomic, political, and
administrative. Theoretically, Muslim scholars should
contribute to developing creative balanced religiously inspired and socially constructed FBOs models to ensure
their fulfillment of religious commitments and gaining
social acceptance. This applies to Muslim minorities in
Western secular societies and is also highly recommended for Muslim-majority countries. For the socioeconomic factors, FBOs are expected to raise structural
issues, such as social justice, fair conflict resolutions, and
empowering disadvantaged groups. Their religious background could inspire them to support social change, instead of replacing withdrawal states in a neoliberal
system. Politically, Islamic FBOs’ influence might challenge negative stereotypes, debate controversial issues,
and contribute to peaceful and fair conflict settlements.
Suggested issues for debate include defining terrorism,
conceptualizing humanitarian intervention, and guiding
the role of religion in the public sphere11. Also, the
FBOs’ administrative improvement is needed. A mere religious mission cannot compensate for professional programs, accountable staff, and transparent policies. These
actions are required for gaining trust and effectively operate in the hosted communities. Material and spiritual
impacts should be measured by innovative indicators to
evaluate the programs’ outcomes.

Finally, the religious inspiration does not guarantee
success for FBOs, instead, they should address people’s
actual concerns and work enthusiastically to achieve factual social change. Otherwise, they will lose their unique
character and miss their religious and humanitarian
missions.

11

For more recommendations, see Live online consultation: faith and
religion in humanitarian, 2015: 4; Gibbons 2005: 12-13.
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